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I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1998 and 2011, the skies over Indian country existed
in a regulatory gap. This gap was not merely inadvertent, but was a
foreseeable consequence of congressional intent to delegate
regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to Indian
tribes. In 1998, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
published the Tribal Authority Rule, which allowed-but did not
require-Indian tribes to implement tribal programs under the
CAA, including programs for issuing permits to new and modified
sources of air emissions in areas under the tribe's jurisdiction.' At
the same time, the CAA continued to mandate analogous state
permitting programs for areas under state jurisdiction. The CAA is,
however, perhaps the most technically ambitious environmental
regulatory program for a state or tribal government to undertake.
While Indian tribes have, with some frequency, undertaken
regulation tunder the Clean Water Act, almost none have availed
themselves of the opportunity under the CAA.2 As a result, there
was no clear mechanism for tribes and other entities to obtain
permits for new and modified sources in most of Indian country.'
In particular, the regulatory gap affected entities seeking
"synthetic minor" permits in Indian country. State permitting
programs offer synthetic minor permits to potentially major
sources that wish to voluntarily employ operating parameters to
limit their emissions.4 That is, an entity seeking to construct or
modify a source of air emissions in an area under state jurisdiction
can "synthetically" limit that source's emissions by agreeing to
certain conditions in a synthetic minor permit, thus avoiding costly,
1. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254,
7259 (Feb. 12, 1998) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49-50, 81
(2014)).
2. See Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed.
Reg. 38,748, 38,778 (July 1, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 49, 51)); Jana B.
Milford, Tribal Authority Under the Clean Air Act: How Is It Working?, 44 NAT.
REsouRCESJ. 213, 242 (2004) ("[F]ew tribes have the resources that are required
to develop comprehensive air programs [under the CAA].").
3. The EPA recognized this regulatory gap in its Tribal Authority Rule.
Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7263.
4. 40 C.F.R. § 49.158. A stationary source is considered "major" if its
potential to emit certain air pollutants exceeds a given threshold. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 112, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2012)). A stationary source is considered
"minor" if it does not exceed any thresholds. See id.
2
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complex, and time-consuming major source permitting
requirements. However, an entity seeking to construct or modify a
source in an area of Indian country that was not regulated by a
tribal permitting program could not obtain a synthetic minor
permit from a state.' Instead, in some cases, such an entity had to
meet the more costly requirements for a major source permit,
including obtaining a pre-construction permit that is not required
6
for a synthetic minor source. As a result, entities seeking to
construct or modify sources of air emissions in Indian country
faced a serious economic disadvantage
In 2011, the EPA finally published its long-awaited "New
Source Review" regulations to fill the regulatory gap in Indian
country." These regulations-entided "Review of New Sources and
Modifications in Indian Country" (Indian Country NSR Rule)-
provided a federal permitting program for areas of Indian country
that are not subject to a tribal permitting program.9 Although this
article argues that states never had regulatory authority in Indian
country, l° the Indian Country NSR Rule clarified that in the
absence of a tribal permitting program, the EPA-not the states-
had authority to issue permits for construction and modification of
5. See Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed.
Reg. 38,748, 38,750-01 (July 1, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 49, 51);
Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Dir., Office of Air Quality Planning &
Standards, to Dir., Office of Ecosystem Prot., Region I et al. 2 (Mar. 7,
1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/region7/air/title5/t5memos/indian6.pdf.
6. Brief of Tribal Intervenors in Support of the U.S. EPA at 26, Okla. Dep't
of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1307), 2013 WL
3856517, at *26 [hereinafter Brief of Tribal Intervenors]; see also Amicus Curiae
State of Minnesota's Brief and Addendum in Support in Part of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency at 4-5, Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d 185
(No. 11-1307), 2013 WL 3934353, at *5-6 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae State of
Minnesota's Brief and Addendum]. In 1999, the EPA issued a policy
memorandum offering guidance for tribes wishing to obtain synthetic minor
permits from the EPA, but the EPA expressly stated that the policy memorandum
lacked binding force. See Memorandum from John S. Seitz, supra note 5, at 5; see
also infra Part III.
7. Brief of Tribal Intervenors, supra note 6, at 26; see also Amicus Curiae
State of Minnesota's Brief and Addendum, supra note 6, at 4-5.
8. Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 38,748.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part V.
[Vol. 41:2
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sources of air emissions in Indian country. I' The federal permitting
program implemented through the Indian Country NSR Rule had
immediate benefits for tribes and other entities engaging in
development in Indian country, including those that sought
synthetic minor permits.
2
But the EPA's filling of the regulatory gap was short-lived.
Shortly after the EPA published the Indian Country NSR Rule, the
Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ)
challenged the rule with a petition filed in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit). 3 On
January 17, 2014, the D.C. Circuit decided Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality v. Environmental Protection Agency, which
vacated the Indian Country NSR Rule with respect to non-
reservation Indian country. Although the Indian Country NSR
Rule remains in force for reservation lands, the D.C. Circuit's
decision re-opened the regulatory gap with respect to non-
reservation lands to the detriment of Indian tribes and other
entities seeking development opportunities in Indian country.
This article gives an in-depth analysis of the D.C. Circuit's
opinion and argues that the EPA has authority under the CAA to
implement a federal permitting program for all of Indian country,
including non-reservation lands. Part II provides background
information about the unique status of tribal territory and the
obligation of the United States to protect Indian property and
interests. '5 Part III describes the history of the Indian Country NSR
Rule, including the EPA's rationale for promulgating the rule.
Part IV explains the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality v. Environmental Protection Agency.' Finally,
Part V contends that both law and policy run contrary to the D.C.
Circuit's decision, which is a setback for tribal self-governance."'
11. Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 38,778.
12. Brief of Tribal Intervenors, supra note 6, at 27; see also Review of New
Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed. Reg. at 38,750.
13. Petition for Review, Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1307).
14. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 195.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infta Part V.
4
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II. INDIAN COUNTRY AND THE UNITED STATES'
TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
Federal law has recognized a distinct status and territory for
Indian tribes since the founding of the United States.' 9 In 1831's
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall described the
Cherokee Nation as "a state, as a distinct political society, separated
from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing• ,,20
itself. Chief Justice Marshall expressed a consistent view one year
later, in Worcester v. Georgia, when he characterized Indian tribes as
"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights.' Given tribes' separateness and
independence, Chief Justice Marshall explained, Indian tribes
exercise inherent self-governing power within their own territory,
supervised by the federal government and free from state
interference. Although federal law has subsequently departed
from ChiefJustice Marshall's bright-line view that state laws have no
force on tribal land, 23 it remains true that state laws generally do
not apply to Indian affairs in Indian country absent express
24authorization by Congress.
"Indian country" is a term of art used to identify tribal
territory, specifically, lands on which tribal laws and customs-asS 25
well as federal laws relating to Indians-are applicable. Congress
has defined Indian country as including three types of land: "land
within the limits of any Indian reservation," "dependent Indian
communities," and "Indian allotments." 26 First, Indian reservations
19. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559-60 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 3.04[2] [a] (Nelljessup Newton ed., 2012), available at LEXIS.
20. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
21. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
24. COHEN'S HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 6.01 [2]; see
also Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998)
("Generally speaking, primary jurisdiction over land that is Indian country rests
with the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it, and not with the
States."); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) ("The policy of leaving Indians
free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.").
25. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19, § 3.04[ 1].
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). This definition is found in the criminal code,
but it applies in the civil context as well. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox
[Vol. 41:2
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consist of lands, protected by the federal government, which have
been reserved for tribal residence or use.27 Second, dependent
Indian communities include non-reservation lands that the federal
government sets aside for Indian use and that are subject to federal• 28
superintendence. Third, Indian allotments are lands owned by
individual Indians, which are either held in trust by the United
States or are subject to federal statutory restrictions on alienation 9
Although Congress has the authority to terminate Indian country
30
status, it must clearly express its intent to do so.
Federal power over Indian country and Indian affairs-to the
exclusion of the states-derives from the U.S. Constitution.3' In
Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall explained that the
Constitution provides the federal government with authority to
govern Indian affairs: "That instrument confers on congress the
powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required
,,32
for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indian[s]. Over
150 years later, the Supreme Court confirmed that the
Constitution-particularly the Commerce Clause and the Treaty
Clause-is the source of Congress' "broad general powers to
legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have
Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202, 207 n.5 (1987), superseded by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988), as recognized in Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 3.04[1].
27. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19,
§ 3.04[2] [c] [ii]; see also Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (discussing the distinction between tribal
trust lands and reservations).
28. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527; see also COHEN's HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19, § 3.04[2] [c] [iii]. The Supreme Court has
found that lands are subject to federal superintendence when the federal
government actively controls such lands, "effectively acting as a guardian for the
Indians." Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted).
29. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19,
§§ 3.04[2] [c] [iv], 16.03[1]; see also United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 470-71
(1926) (discussing the differences between trust and restricted allotments).
30. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998); see also
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19, § 3.04[3].
31. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 5.01[1].
32. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
6
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consistently described as 'plenary and exclusive."' 3 In short, the
federal government's broad authority over Indian affairs is a matter
of constitutional law.
34
Further, the United States has a special trust relationship with
Indian tribes. Chief Justice Marshall's characterization of Indian
tribes in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, as "domestic dependent nations"
whose "relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian,3 5 helped form the modern trust doctrine, which has its
roots in early treaties between the federal government and Indian
tribes, as well as statutes and Supreme Court decisions. 6 Under the
modern trust doctrine, federal interests in Indian country lands
impose responsibilities on the federal government to protect the
interests and property of both Indian tribes and individual
Indians.37 The federal government's responsibilities toward Indians
extend to agencies, including the EPA. In 1984, the EPA officially
33. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citations omitted); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
34. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)
("The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over
relations with Indian tribes." (citations omitted)); McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 169 (1973) ("The whole intercourse between the
United States and [Indian tribes], is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States." (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561)).
35. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Because the Cherokee
Nation was not a foreign state, the Supreme Court held that it lacked original
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation's lawsuit against the State of Georgia. Id. at
19-20.
36. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19, § 5.04[3] [a].
See generally Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty:
The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1495-506.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (relying on
"the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian people"); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (explaining that the federal government's "substantial trust responsibilities
toward Native Americans" are "undeniable" and "grounded in the very nature of
the government-Indian relationship"); see also Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539,
546-47 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the Commerce Secretary "did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously" when he issued an emergency fishing regulation, but
rather, fulfilled his federal trust obligations to Indians); Nw. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1519-20 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding
that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers fulfilled its federal trust obligation to
Indians when it denied a corporation's permit application); COHEN'S HANDBOOK
OFFEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 5.04[3] [a].
38. HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) ("EPA, as an
agency of the federal government, has an independent duty to protect Indian
[Vol. 41:2
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acknowledged its trust responsibility in its Policy for the
Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations
(1984 Indian Policy Statement), stating:
EPA recognizes that a trust responsibility derives from
the historical relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian Tribes as expressed in certain
treaties and Federal Indian Law. In keeping with that trust
responsibility, the Agency will endeavor to protect the
environmental interests of Indian Tribes when carrTing
out its responsibilities that may affect the reservations.9
In sum, the federal government has set aside Indian country
lands for Indian tribes and individual Indians, and it exercises
authority over such lands, consistent with its trust responsibility, to
the exclusion of the states.
III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE EPA's NEW SOURCE
REVIEW RULE FOR INDIAN COUNTRY
The CAA operates on a model of cooperative federalism,
providing roles for the EPA, states, and Indian tribes. Under this
model, the EPA must establish National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS), and states must adopt plans to achieve these
standards. 1 Each state has "primary responsibility" for ensuring air
quality in its own geographic region and must submit a state
42implementation plan (SIP) to the EPA for approval. Each SIP
must provide for the "implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement" of ambient air quality standards.43 In so doing, each
SIP must contain a permitting program-or new source review
interests....").
39. WILLIAM D. RucKFLsHAus, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 3 (1984).
40. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 10.02;James
M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA's Indian Program, 15 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 198
(2006).
41. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7410(a) (2012); see also Grijalva, supra
note 40, at 205. The EPA must set NAAQS for widespread pollutants from
numerous and diverse sources that are harmful to public health and to the
environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), (b).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1).
43. Id.§7410(a)(1).
8
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program-for construction and modification of air pollution
44
sources.
A. Involvement of Indian Tribes in Implementation of Clean Air Act
Programs Prior to the Indian Country NSR Rule
The CAA was initially silent with respect to the role of Indian
tribes.45 Despite this statutory silence, Indian tribes were involved in
the implementation of Clean Air Act programs. 46 For example,
Indian tribes implemented the EPA's program for preventing
"significant deterioration" of air quality in regions that had already41
attained the EPA's national standards. In light of congressional
silence, "EPA implicitly assumed tribes possessed the authority EPA
assumed states lacked"-that is, the authority to regulate air quality
on reservation land.4" In addition, the EPA established its 1984
Indian Policy Statement to "expand on existing EPA Indian Policy
statements in a manner consistent with the overall Federal position
in support of Tribal 'self-government' and 'government-to-
government' relations between Federal and Tribal Governments.,
49
To this end, the EPA stated its intention to treat tribal governments
as states under EPA programs, including the CAA: 'Just as EPA's
deliberations and activities have traditionally involved the interests
and/or participation of State Governments, EPA will look directly
to Tribal Governments toglay this lead role for matters affecting
reservation environments.
44. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(C). A new source review permit is a pre-construction
permit, as opposed to an operating permit for an existing source of air pollution.
See generally Bernard F. Hawkins Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, The New Source Review
Program, in AM. BAR AsS'N, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 125-85 (Julie R. Domike
& Alec C. Zacaroli eds., 3d ed. 2011) (explaining new source review permits);
Angela R. Morrison, Overview of the Title V Operating Permit Program, in AM. BAR
ASW'N, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra, at 557 (explaining operating
permits).
45. SeeJill E. Grant, Implementation of Clean Air Act Programs by American Indian
Tribes, in AM. BAR As'N, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 675; see
also Grijalva, supra note 40, at 202.
46. See generally Grijalva, supra note 40 (explaining how tribes were involved
in Clean Air Act programs prior to 1990).
47. See id. at 205, 212-17.
48. Id. at 208.
49. RucKELsHAus, supra note 39, at 1.
50. Id. at 2; see also Grijalva, supra note 40, at 280-81.
[Vol. 41:2
9
Duncan and Martenson: I Can See Clearly Now: The EPA's Authority to Regulate Indian Cou
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
2015] EPA'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INDIAN COUNTRY 497
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA to provide an express
role for Indian tribes. Specifically, the 1990 amendments added
section 301 (d), which authorizes the EPA to "treat Indian tribes as
States" under the CAA.5 Under this provision, an Indian tribe may
develop and implement a tribal implementation plan (TIP) if the
tribe meets three criteria: (1) the tribe must have a governing body
with "substantial govern[ing] duties and powers," (2) the TIP must
provide for "the management and protection of air resources
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas
within the tribe's jurisdiction," and (3) the tribe must be
"reasonably expected to be capable" of carrying out the TIP.12
Legislative history of the 1990 amendments confirms that Congress
intended for the EPA to maintain responsibility for enforcing the
CAA in Indian country in the event that a tribal government chose
not to assume primary enforcement responsibility under section
301 (d). 3
The EPA implemented section 301 (d) through the Tribal
Authority Rule, promulgated in 1998. ' The Tribal Authority Rule
clarified section 301 (d) in two significant ways. First, the Rule
interpreted the geographic reach of a tribe's jurisdiction under
section 301(d). The EPA construed "reservation" to include formal
reservations, pueblos, and tribal trust lands, and it construed "other
areas within the Tribe's jurisdiction" to mean "non-reservation
areas of Indian country"-namely, dependent Indian communities
and Indian allotments.55 With respect to "reservations," the CAA
operates as a delegation of federal authority to tribes to administer
51. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (1) (A) (2012).
52. Id. § 7601(d)(2)-(3).
53. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 78 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3466 ("This provision also confirms the Agency's obligation and responsibility to
enforce the Act in Indian Country should a tribal government choose not to
assume primary enforcement responsibility."). When the amendments were passed
in 1990, the proposed section 328 became section 301(d). Compare id., with Clean
Water Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107, 104 Stat. 2399, 2464-
65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410).
54. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254,
7259 (Feb. 12, 1998) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50, 81
(2014)); see Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(upholding the EPA's rule).
55. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at
7258-59; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDAN LAw, supra note 19,
§ 10.03[3]. The EPA's construction tracks the U.S. Criminal Code's definition for
the term "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
10
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programs regulating air resources within each tribe's reservation. 56
As such, a tribe seeking to implement a TIP is not required to
demonstrate jurisdiction over its reservation lands.
In contrast, tribes must affirmatively establish their authority to
regulate air resources in "non-reservation areas of Indian
country."' Although a tribe may cite any basis for its assertion of
authority, typically a tribe will rely on its inherent authority.
Indian tribes have inherent authority to govern tribal members, but
this inherent authority does not extend to all activities of non-
members, even when such activities take place in Indian country.60
As a result, a tribe seeking to implement a TIP in a non-reservation
area of Indian country must demonstrate that the non-member
activities that the tribe seeks to regulate-for example, constructing
or modifying a source of air pollution-directly affect the "political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe., 6' The Tribal Authority Rule indicates the EPA's intent to
determine a tribe's jurisdiction over a particular non-reservation
62area on a case-by-case basis.
Second, the Tribal Authority Rule makes tribal development of
CAA programs voluntary. In the EPA's view, tribes-in comparison
to states-are generally "in the early stages of developing air
planning and implementation expertise."" Consequently,
it would be infeasible and inappropriate to subject tribes
to the mandatory submittal deadlines imposed by the Act
on states, and to the related federal oversight mechanisms
in the Act which are triggered when EPA makes a finding
56. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at
7259; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19,
§ 10.0313].
57. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OFFEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 10.03[3].
58. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at
7255, 7259; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19,
§ 10.03[3].
59. See Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at
7259; COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19, § 10.03[3].
60. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
61. Id.; COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 19,
§ 10.03[2]-[3].
62. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at
7259.
63. Id. at 7265.
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that states have failed to meet required deadlines or acts
to disapprove a plan submittal. 4
Thus, although states must implement SIPs to regulate air
quality, neither the CAA nor the Tribal Authority Rule compels
tribes to develop and implement air quality programs.
At the same time, consistent with the federal government's
trust responsibility, the Tribal Authority Rule states that the EPA
maintains its obligation to "ensure the protection of air quality
throughout the nation, including throughout Indian country."'65 In
particular, the Rule announces the EPA's intention to promulgate
national rules that will apply to the parts of Indian country where
tribes do not develop and implement TIPs. ;6 Moreover, the Tribal
Authority Rule recognizes the existence of gaps in its regulations
with respect to Indian country: "EPA has determined that the CAA
provides the Agency with very broad statutory authority to regulate
sources of pollution in Indian country, but there are instances in
which EPA has not yet promulgated regulations to implement its
statutory authority. To remedy the gap in permitting programs in
Indian country, the Rule declares the EPA's intention to
promulgate "nationally applicable regulations for . . . minor and
major source permitting programs"-that is, a new source review
rule for construction and modifications of air pollution sources in
Indian country in the absence of an applicable TIP.68
The EPA, however, waited more than a decade to promulgate
regulations to remedy the gap in Indian country pre-construction
permitting programs under the Clean Air Act for new and
modified sources.9  One unexplained mystery of the EPA's
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. ("[T]he Agency will promulgate a FIP to protect tribal air quality
within a reasonable time if tribal efforts do not result in adoption and approval of
tribal plans or programs.").
67. Id. at 7263.
68. Id.
69. In 1999, the EPA published a final rule establishing a federal operating
permits program that applied to existing sources of air emissions in Indian
country. See Federal Operating Permits Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 8247 (Feb. 19,
1999) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 71 (2014)). The rule did not address
new source review permits for Indian country sources and did not provide a
mechanism for obtaining synthetic minor permits in Indian country. Id. Further,
the D.C. Circuit partially vacated the rule in Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1089
(D.C. Cir. 2001). See infra Part IV.
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approach to air regulation in Indian country is: Why the long delay
in promulgating the Indian Country NSR Rule? Lack of such a rule
demonstrably retarded development in Indian country and created
the potential for widespread noncompliance.7 ° Perhaps the EPA
sensed state resistance to any efforts to federally regulate in states
with approved SIPs; however, many states were clear in recognizing
the lack of state authority in Indian country.
7'
In the interim, the EPA issued a policy memorandum
addressing concerns regarding synthetic minor source permitting
in Indian country.7 2 In the memorandum, the EPA recognized that
no federal mechanism allowed tribes and other entities to obtain
synthetic minor permits to avoid triggering major source
requirements in Indian country.73 The EPA also asserted its view
that "State or local permits . .. issued to sources in Indian country
... are not effective . . . unless EPA ha[d] explicitly approved the
State or local permitting program. 7" Acknowledging the benefits of
synthetic minor permits in Indian country, the policy
memorandum provided a limited avenue for Indian country
sources to obtain synthetic minor permits from the EPA.75 However,
the EPA expressly stated that the policy memorandum lacked
binding force: "The policies set forth in this memorandum are
intended solely as guidance, do not represent final Agency action,
and cannot be relied upon to create any rights enforceable by any
party."7" Further, not all Indian country sources were able to take
advantage of the policy outlined in the EPA's 1999 memorandum.77
B. The EPA's Indian Country NSR Rule
In 2011, the EPA promulgated the regulations it promised
over a decade earlier. The Indian Country NSR Rule provides for a
federal implementation plan (FIP), including two new source
review regulations for Indian country.7 8 The first regulation applies
70. See Brief of Tribal Intervenors, supra note 6, at 26-30.
71. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae State of Minnesota's Brief and Addendum, supra
note 6, at 6.
72. Memorandum from John S. Seitz, supra note 5, at 1.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id. at 5.
77. See Brief of Tribal Intervenors, supra note 6, at 15-16.
78. Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed.
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to "new and modified minor stationary sources (minor sources),
and to minor modifications at existing major stationary sources
(major sources) throughout Indian country. ' '79 This regulation
includes a mechanism for obtaining synthetic minor source
permits."' The second regulation applies to "new and modified
major sources in areas of Indian country that are designated as not
attaining the [NAAQSI" set by the EPA. As it did in 1998, the EPA
stated its intention to "fill [the] regulatory gap" caused by the lack
of a federal permitting program for minor sources in Indian
country and for major sources in nonattainment areas of Indian
82
country. In addition, the EPA recognized that "only a few Tribes
have yet sought eligibility to administer a minor NSR program and
no Tribe has yet sought eligibility for the nonattainment major
NSR program."" As such, the Indian Country NSR Rule applies in
all parts of Indian country "where no EPA-approved minor NSR or
nonattainment major NSR program is in place.""' If, however, the
EPA subsequently approves a TIP for any specific area of Indian
country, such plan would supersede the Indian Country NSR
Rule."5
The EPA's Indian Country NSR Rule also explains the EPA's
view of its authority to regulate air quality in Indian country.
According to the EPA, it has "authority tinder sections 301 (a) and
301 (d) (4) of the CAA and 40 CFR 49.11(a) to promulgate FIPs in
order to remedy an existing regulatory gap under the CAA with
respect to Indian country. Section 301 (a) authorizes the EPA to
promulgate regulations under the CAA.8 Section 301 (d) (4) gives
the EPA discretion in its application of section 301 (d): "In any case
in which the Administrator determines that the treatment of Indian
Reg. 38,748, 38,748 (July 1, 2011) (codified at40 C.F.R. pts. 49, 51 (2014)).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 38,769-71.
81. Id. at 38,748.
82. Id. at 38,749-50. Nonattainment areas have air quality worse than the
NAAQS set by the EPA. See id. at 38,751.
83. Id. at 38,778.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 38,752.
86. Id. at 38,778; see Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat.
485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a) (2012)); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107(d), 104 Stat. 2399, 2464-65
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (4)); 40 C.F.R. § 49.11 (2014).
87. Air Quality Act § 2.
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tribes as identical to States is inappropriate or administratively
infeasible, the Administrator may provide, by regulation, other
means by which the Administrator will directly administer such
provisions so as to achieve the appropriate purpose. ''s The section
of the 1998 Tribal Authority Rule codified at 40 CFR 49.11 (a) gives
the EPA authority to promulgate "such Federal implementation
plan provisions as are necessary or appropriate to protect air
quality" in areas lacking a tribal implementation plan.s9 In other
words, in the EPA's view, it has authority to implement a FIP for
Indian country pursuant to Congress' broad grant of authority to
the EPA in the CAA.90 In addition, the EPA stated its view that
"states generally lack the authority to regulate air quality in Indian
country."9 Thus, the EPA-rather than the states-has authority to
implement a federal permitting program in any area of Indian
country where a tribe does not implement a TIP.
IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S OPINION IN OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY V. EPA
Shortly after publication of the final Indian Country NSR Rule,
ODEQ filed a Petition for Review with the D.C. Circuit, arguing
that the EPA exceeded its authority under the CAA by
92promulgating the Rule. Specifically, ODEQ challenged the EPA's
88. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 107(d) (4).
89. 40 C.F.R. § 49.11 (a).
90. See Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 38,752.
91. Id. at 38,779. The EPA's view is consistent with law establishing the
federal government's authority to govern Indian country and Indian affairs,
largely to the exclusion of the states. See supra Part II.
92. Petition for Review, supra note 13. ODEQ claimed that the D.C. Circuit
had jurisdiction to review the EPA's Indian Country NSR Rule pursuant to CAA
section 307(b)(1). Brief of the Petitioner at 2, Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA,
740 F.3d 185 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1307), 2013 WL 1208575, at *2. CAA section
307(b)(1) reads in part: "A petition for review of . . . any other nationally
applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator
under this chapter may be filed only in the Unites States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia." Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012). The EPA
agreed with ODEQ with respect to the D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction. EPA's Proof
Merits Brief at 1, Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d 185 (No. 11-1307), 2013 WL
3816981 at *1; see also Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian
Country, 76 Fed. Reg. at 38,788 ("Under section 307(b) (1) of the Act, petitions for
judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit by August 30, 2011.").
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authority to implement a federal CAA program in non-reservation
Indian country, including allotments and dependent Indian
communities.9' ODEQ did not argue that the Indian Country NSR
Rule adversely affected a particular development project located in
non-reservation Indian country within Oklahoma's boundaries, but
rather opposed the Indian Country NSR Rule on its face,
contending that the EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act
through arbitrary and capricious rulemaking. 9' In support of this
argument, ODEQ first contended that the regulatory gap cited by
the EPA does not exist with respect to non-reservation Indian
country, because each state's SIP applies to all non-reservation
Indian country where no Indian tribe has demonstrated its
inherent jurisdiction.95 ODEQ next maintained that the EPA failed
to make required jurisdictional findings with respect to non-
reservation areas of Indian country. 96 Notably, ODEQ did not
challenge the Indian Country NSR Rule as it pertained to Indian
reservations.7 The Navajo Nation, the Shakopee Mdewakanton
Sioux Community, the Red Lake Band of Chippewa, and the
United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.9 intervened in support of
the EPA. "0
In an opinion written by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, the D.C.
Circuit agreed with ODEQ and vacated the Indian Country NSR
Rule with respect to non-reservation Indian country."' This Part
provides a close reading of the opinion, while Part V explains the
court's errors.
93. Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 92, at 9-11.
94. Id. at 38; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
95. Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 92, at 18-19.
96. Id. at 55-57.
97. See id. at 11.
98. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, No. 11-1307 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27,
2012) (order granting motion for leave to intervene filed by the Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community, the Red Lake Band of Chippewa, and the Navajo
Nation).
99. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, No. 11-1307 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28,
2012) (order granting motion for leave to intervene filed by the United States and
the South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.).
100. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
101. Id. at 187.
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A. Disposal of the EPA 's Threshold Objections
The court began by rejecting the EPA's three threshold
objections to ODEQ's challenge. 12The EPA argued that ODEQ
lacked standing to challenge the Indian Country NSR Rule because
ODEQ's alleged injury was self-inflicted.0 3 Namely, the EPA argued
that ODEQ could remedy its "injury" by applying to the EPA for
SIP authority to regulate non-reservation lands under the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act
(SAFETEA).'°4 The court rejected the EPA's standing argument on
the basis that the EPA could interpret SAFETEA as authorizing the
EPA to attach conditions to any "approval of Oklahoma's SIP as
applied to Indian country."'' 1 5 Thus, the "remedy" proposed by the
EPA would be uncertain, and "[t]he possibility of an alternative
remedy, of uncertain availability and effect, does not render its
injury self-inflicted."'06 Instead, the D.C. Circuit agreed with
ODEQ's contention that ODEQ had standing to challenge the
Indian Country NSR Rule, because the rule would divest ODEQ of
its regulatory authority over non-reservation Indian country, an
injury that the court could redress by vacating the rule with respect
to non-reservation Indian country lands.'0 7
The EPA's second threshold objection was that ODEQ's
challenge came too late.' °s Under section 307(b) (1) of the CAA, a
party wishing to challenge a final rule issued by the EPA under the
CAA must file a petition for review of that rule with the D.C. Circuit
within sixty days of the EPA's publication of that rule in the Federal
Register. 1'9 If the challenging party files its petition too late, the
D.C. Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the rule." Citing this
102. Id. at 189-92.
103. Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 9-10, Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality,
740 F.3d 185 (No. 11-1307), 2013 WL 6185841, at *9-10.
104. Id. at 9. See generally Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
Congress added an Oklahoma-specific provision to this mammoth transportation
bill to increase Oklahoma's ability to regulate in Indian Country under the CAA.
Id. tit. X, subtitle B, § 10211.
105. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 190.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 189-90.
108. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 45.
109. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 307(b) (1),
104 Stat. 2682, 2682 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (2012)).
110. See id.; see also Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 191.
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provision of the CAA, the EPA argued that the Tribal Authority
Rule, issued in 1998, made it clear that the EPA "interpreted past
SIP approvals as not applying in Indian country unless the relevant
State had made an explicit demonstration of authority and unless
EPA had expressly approved the SIP as applying in Indian
country."'.. As such, the EPA argued that ODEQ could not argue
that Oklahoma's SIP, rather than the EPA's FIP, applied on non-
reservation areas of Indian country, because ODEQ did not
challenge that aspect of the Tribal Authority Rule in 1998."' The
D.C. Circuit, however, disagreed and found that the Tribal
Authority Rule did not clearly rescind prior state authority over
non-reservation Indian country. According to the court, the
Indian Country NSR Rule "says expressly what the 1998 Rule at
most left uncertain: The EPA deems a SIP presumptively
inapplicable in both reservation and non-reservation areas of
Indian country because 'states generally lack the authority to
regulate air quality in Indian country."" Thus, ODEQ's challenge,
which ODEQ initiated within sixty days of publication of the Indian
Country NSR Rule, was timely. 5
For its third threshold objection, the EPA argued that ODEQ
forfeited its argument that Oklahoma's SIP presumptively applies
in non-reservation Indian country."" A party wishing to challenge a
rule promulgated by the EPA must present its argument to the EPA
before seeking judicial review."7 According to the EPA, Oklahoma
failed to raise its contention that section 107(a) of the CAA
requires application of Oklahoma's SIP in Indian country during
the public comment period on the Indian Country NSR Rule and
therefore forfeited its right to raise this argument before the D.C.
111. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 30; see Okla. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 740 F.3d at 190-91.
112. See EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 45.
113. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 191.
114. Id. (quoting Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country,
76 Fed. Reg. 38,748, 38,779 (July 1, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 49, 51
(2014))).
115. Id. The docket history for this case on Westlaw states that petitioner
(ODEQ) filed for review on August 29, 2011. See Petition for Review, supra note 13.
This filing came 59 days after the NSR rule was published on July 1, 2011. See id.
116. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 44-46.
117. Okla. Dep't of EnvtL Quality, 740 F.3d at 192 (citing Vt. Dep't of Pub. Serv.
v. United States, 684 F.3d 149, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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Circuit.l l8 Rejecting the EPA's argument, the court explained that
although ODEQ's "argument might have been raised more clearly
before the EPA," the argument was directed toward a "key
assumption" underlying the Indian Country NSR Rule."' The EPA
had a duty to justify its assumption that a SIP presumptively does
not apply in Indian country, even if no one objected to that
assumption during the Indian Country NSR Rule's comment
period."" The court concluded that the EPA failed to fully examinethis assumption; therefore, the issue was not forfeited. 2'
B. The Decision on the Merits
After disposing of the EPA's threshold objections, the D.C.
Circuit turned to the merits of the case. The court began by
reviewing its decision in Michigan v. EPA, in which the court
clarified the EPA's authority to implement federal CAA
programs."' In Michigan, the petitioners had challenged the EPA's
Federal Operating Permits Program Rule, particularly the EPA's
proposal to administer a federal operating permit program for
areas where it believed Indian country status was "in question.'
24
The Michigan court explained that the EPA only has authority to
implement a federal program when the EPA is standing in for a
state or a tribe.125 If a state fails to implement an approved state
program, the EPA can implement a federal program in place of the
state program.126 If an Indian tribe does not promulgate a tribal
program, the EPA can implement a federal program in place of a
tribal program.12 The EPA cannot, however, declare that certain
lands are "in question" and then implement a federal program in
118. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 45.
119. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 192 (quoting Appalachian Power
Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
120. Id. (citing Appalachian Power Co., 135 F.3d at 818).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 193 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
123. Federal Operating Permits Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 8247 (Feb. 19, 1999)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 71 (2014)).
124. Michigan, 268 F.3d at 1077-78.
125. Id. at 1085.
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the absence of clear state or tribal authority. 28 In the words of the
Michigan court,
There are no intermediate grounds on which EPA may
indefinitely exercise jurisdiction-it is either acting in the
shoes of a tribe or the shoes of the state. There is no
residual authority granted by the CAA for the EPA to
refuse to make ajurisdictional determination and operate
a federal program under some general authority of its
129
own.
According to the D.C. Circuit, "The principles we identified in
Michigan control this case. ' 'tmo Under the Tribal Authority Rule, the
court explained, an Indian tribe may regulate its reservation lands
without establishing jurisdiction over them, but an Indian tribe
must affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction over non-reservation
lands it wishes to regulate.' l Further, under Michigan, jurisdiction
to implement a CAA program is "binary"; it lies either "with [a]-- ,,132
state or with [a] tribe-one or the other. Therefore, when an
Indian tribe has not demonstrated jurisdiction over non-reservation
lands, the Indian tribe lacks jurisdiction, and jurisdiction
necessarily lies with the state.' In other words, the D.C. Circuit
analogized non-reservation lands to the "in question" lands at issue
in Michigan and concluded that the EPA could not implement a
CAA program regulating non-reservation lands, unless either the
EPA or an Indian tribe demonstrated tribal authority over each
non-reservation area subject to the EPA's program. I1 4 This analogy,
however, makes little sense, because non-reservation Indian lands
are unquestionably Indian country.135
128. See id. at 1086.
129. Id. at 1085.
130. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
131. Id. at 194; see also Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management,
63 Fed. Reg. 7254, 7255 (Feb. 12, 1998) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
35, 49, 50, 81 (2014)).
132. Okla. Dep't of Envil. Quality, 740 F.3d at 193 (quoting Michigan, 268 F.3d at
1086).
133. See id. at 194.
134. Id.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
522 U.S. 520, 530 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114,
123 (1993); United States v.John, 437 U.S. 634, 648 (1978).
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C. Rejection of the EPA 's Counterarguments
Finally, the D.C. Circuit turned to the EPA's
counterarguments, repeatedly relying on its overly expansive
interpretation of Michigan to reject them. The EPA first argued that
Congress intended a different binary authority rule for Indian
country-both reservation and non-reservation lands." 6 Whereas
either a state or an Indian tribe has regulatory authority over non-
Indian country lands and "in question" lands, either the EPA or an
Indian tribe has regulatory authority over land designated as Indian
country.137 In support of this argument, the EPA cited section
301 (d) (4) of the CAA, which provides the EPA with authority to
"directly administer" CAA provisions in Indian country when the
"EPA determines it to be inappropriate or administratively,,138
infeasible to treat Indian Tribes in the same manner as States.
The court rejected this argument, explaining that either a state or
an Indian tribe has regulatory authority over a given geographic
area, regardless of the area's Indian country status. Where an
Indian tribe has no current regulatory authority, even over non-
reservation land that is concededly Indian country, the state
necessarily has authority. 40
Next, the EPA pointed out that Michigan's rule of binary
jurisdiction applies to lands in which the Indian country status is in
question-and that might not in fact be Indian country-but does
not apply to lands designated as Indian country, where no Indian
tribe has current regulatory authority.4 ' According to the EPA,
Michigan actually supports the Indian Country NSR Rule, because
Michigan never doubted the EPA's authority to implement a federal
permitting program with respect to areas unquestionably
designated as Indian country under federal law. 42 The D.C. Circuit,
however, rejected this argument as well, reiterating its position that
either a state or an Indian tribe-and never the EPA-has
jurisdiction over any given geographic area, regardless of its Indian
143
country status.
136. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 49.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (4)).
139. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 194.
140. Id.
141. See EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 36.
142. Id.
143. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 193-94.
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The EPA also argued that the Tribal Authority Rule did not
require the EPA to make the same jurisdictional findings that an
Indian tribe would have to make in order to exercise regulatory
authority on the Indian tribe's behalf."44 In other words, in the
EPA's view, the EPA need not determine, on a case-by-case basis,
grounds for tribal authority over each area of non-reservation
Indian country that the EPA seeks to regulate under a nationwide
FIP."45 Relatedly, the tribal interveners contended that the CAA
grants the EPA residual authority over all Indian lands, even if the
EPA lacks residual authority over non-Indian lands and "in
question" lands.146 The court dismissed these arguments based on
its statement in Michigan that the EPA may only regulate "in the
shoes" of an Indian tribe or "in the shoes" of a state."7 Based on
Michigan, the court reasoned that "the EPA is subject to the same
limitations as the tribe itself.' 1 8 As such, the EPA must demonstrate
tribal jurisdiction before it may exercise CAAjurisdiction over non-
reservation lands. 149
Lastly, the EPA argued that the D.C. Circuit should defer to
the EPA's interpretation of past approvals of SIPs as not applying in
Indian country.' Under the United States Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Auer v. Robbins, an agency's interpretation
of its own regulation controls unless such interpretation is "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'' Thus, the EPA
argued, the D.C. Circuit should uphold the EPA's interpretation of
the EPA's past SIP approvals, which were published in the Federal
Register, because the EPA's interpretation was not "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent" with past SIP approvals. 5 2 However, the
D.C. Circuit rejected this argument on the basis that the EPA's
interpretation was based on an incorrect assumption that "states
generally lack the authority to regulate air quality in Indian
country," including non-reservation lands where no Indian tribe
144. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 40.
145. See id. at 40-43.
146. See Brief of Tribal Intervenors, supra note 6, at 7.
147. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 195.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92, at 33.
151. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
152. EPA's Proof Merits Brief, supra note 92 at 34 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at
461).
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has demonstrated jurisdiction. 53 As such, the court determined
that the EPA's interpretation was "plainly erroneous" and therefore
warranted no deference from the court.
Having rejected each of EPA's arguments, the D.C. Circuit
declared its holding:
We hold a state has regulatory jurisdiction under the
Clean Air Act over all land within its territory and outside
the boundaries of an Indian reservation except insofar as
an Indian tribe or the EPA has demonstrated a tribe has
jurisdiction. Until such a demonstration has been made,
neither a tribe nor the EPA standing in the shoes of a
tribe may displace a state's implementation plan with
respect to a non-reservation area of the state. 1
5
With this conclusion-and its problematic rationale-the
court vacated the EPA's Indian Country NSR Rule with respect to
non-reservation Indian country.151
V. WHY OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OFENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY V. EPA
WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
Both law and policy undermine the D.C. Circuit's decision.
Indeed, for at least four reasons, the D.C. Circuit reached the
wrong conclusion in this case.
A. The Abstract Nature of ODEQ's Alleged Injury
First, the D.C. Circuit overstepped the constitutional
boundaries of its authority by deciding the validity of the Indian
Country NSR Rule despite the absence of any particular, on-the-
ground controversy caused by it. To establish standing pursuant to
the U.S. Constitution, as the D.C. Circuit recognized, a plaintiff has
the burden of establishing that it suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is actual or imminent. 57 In Oklahoma
153. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 195 (quoting Review of New
Sources and Modifications in Indian Country, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,748-01, 38,752 (July
1, 2011) (codified at40 C.F.R. pts. 49, 51) (2014)).
154. Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(explaining the three requirements of Article III standing: (1) injury, (2)
causation, and (3) redressability); see Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 189;
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Department of Environmental Quality v. EPA, ODEQ alleged only that
the Indian Country NSR Rule injured ODEQ by stripping its
existing jurisdiction over non-reservation Indian country under the
CAA. 1SODEQ did not point to a particular development project
on non-reservation Indian country lands that ODEQ wished to
regulate. To the contrary, Oklahoma's nationwide challenge to the
Indian Country NSR Rule was exactly the sort of programmatic
challenge that the courts for decades have barred environmental
groups from launching against federal agencies. 1 9 The D.C.
Circuit, however, did not even address the abstract nature of
ODEQ's alleged injury; instead, it asserted without analysis:
"Clearly, Oklahoma has alleged an injury... ."'6 Because ODEQ
alleged no concrete and particularized injury, neither the D.C.
Circuit nor the parties could assess the actual implications of the
case or the effects that the court's decision would have on
development in Indian country.1
6'
B. The D.C. Circuit's Misapplication of Michigan v. EPA
Second, the D.C. Circuit's reliance on Michigan was misplaced.
Non-reservation areas of Indian country-even when neither the
EPA nor a tribe has affirmatively established jurisdiction over such
non-reservation lands-are not the same as lands whose Indian
country status is in question. The difference is, of course, that non-
see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
158. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 189.
159. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 890-94 (1990); see also Sierra
Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898-902 (2002); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
at 567-67 (1992).
160. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 190.
161. It is also possible that ODEQ would have been forced to challenge the
Indian Country NSR Rule in connection with a particular development project in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, rather than in the D.C. Circuit.
The CAA states that "[a] petition for review of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan . . . which is locally or
regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for
the appropriate circuit." Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012). Arguably,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which is located in an area of the
country with many Indian tribes, would have been a more favorable venue for the
EPA. See, e.g., HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that the EPA was within its authority to find that "checkerboard" lands had Indian
country status for purposes of the Safe Drinking Water Act).
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reservation Indian country is still Indian country, 162 whereas "in
question" lands might not be Indian country at all. 163 Although the
D.C. Circuit brushed this distinction aside with little discussion,
"Indian country" status has real legal significance. Over one
hundred years ofjurisprudence has established the limited role of
states on Indian lands. Governance on Indian lands falls to tribal
governments and the federal government, typically to the exclusion
of state governments, and the federal government has a trust
obligation toward Indian tribes and Indian lands.' Given the
difference between the "in question" lands at issue in Michigan and
the non-reservation Indian country lands at issue in Oklahoma
Department of Environmental Quality v. EPA, the federal government
ought to retain authority to regulate air quality in non-reservation
areas of Indian country.
C. Congress'Intent to Provide for Tribal or Federal Regulation of Indian
Country-Not State Regulation
Third, the D.C. Circuit's decision did not comport with
Congress' intent when Congress amended the CAA to add section
301 (d)'s authorization to treat Indian tribes as states. Although
there is little discussion of the "Treatment as a State" (TAS)
provision in the congressional record, there is no indication that
Congress intended the states to have residual authority over non-
reservation lands in the event that a tribe did not affirmatively- 166
demonstrate jurisdiction over such lands. Rather, the Senate
Report stressed cooperation between the federal government and
tribal governments, explaining that the purpose of the TAS
162. Indian lands include non-reservation land. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151; Alaska v.
Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 530 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n
v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993); United States v.John, 437 U.S. 634,
648 (1978).
163. See Final Brief for Respondent at 30-32, Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-1151 to -1155), 2001 WL 36046990, at *30-32.
164. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527 n.1; California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215-16, 221-22 (1987), superseded by statute,
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988);
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1985); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1980); Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 220 n.4 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 558-60 (1832); see
also supra Part II.
165. See supra Part II.
166. 132 CONG. REc. 6284-02 (1986).
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provision is to "improve the environmental quality of the air
[within] Indian country in a manner consistent with the EPA
Indian Policy and 'the overall Federal position in support of Tribal
self-government and the government-to-government relations
between Federal and Tribal Governments.""" In addition, the
Senate Report emphasized the EPA's duty-not merely authority-
to implement CAA programs on all Indian lands in the absence of
a tribal implementation program: "This provision also confirms the
Agency's obligation and responsibility to enforce the Act in Indian
Country should a tribal government choose not to assume primary
enforcement responsibility."' 68 Further, the Senate Report noted
"the Federal government's general authority in Indian Country.' 
69'
In short, the Senate Report suggests that Congress assumed that
regulation of Indian lands would fall either to a tribe or to the
federal government-not to a state.
7
0
Further, to the extent that there was ambiguity in Congress'
commands, the court should have deferred to the EPA's
interpretation of the CAA in the Indian Country NSR Rule. Under
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a court reviewing an
agency's construction of a statute administered by that agency must
defer to the agency's construction of the statute unless Congress
has clearly addressed the question at issue. 7' Here, the D.C. Circuit
should have deferred to the EPA's reasonable construction of the
CAA.172 Indeed, it may make sense for a tribe that seeks treatment
as a state under the CAA to be required to establish its jurisdiction
over the non-reservation Indian country that it seeks to regulate.
However, until that occurs (which has been rare to date), there is
neither reason nor need for the EPA to prove tribal jurisdiction
167. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 78 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3465; RucKELsHAus, supra note 39, at 1.
168. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 3466.
169. Id.
170. Likewise, the Senate Debate on the amendments adding a Treatment as
a State provision to the Safe Drinking Water Act stressed federal-tribal governance
without reference to state involvement. 132 CONG. REc. 6284-02 ("I think the
United States has a trust responsibility to help the Indian people remedy [lack of
access to clean water], and that was my primary interest in originally cosponsoring
these amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act." (statement of Sen. Hart)).
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over every piece of non-reservation Indian country in a FIP-it is all
federally owned or regulated land, so implementing a federal
regulatory place holder, pending future assertions of tribal
jurisdiction, seems to be a permissible construction of
congressional intent in the 1990 CAA amendments. Should a
particularized, justiciable dispute arise over a permitted source in a
particular locale, the issue of regulatory authority can be decided
by the courts, not on the basis of the EPA's jurisdictional reach, but
on whether there is some legitimate basis to contest the Indian
country status of the locale at issue or the substance of the tribe's
asserted jurisdiction. If not, a federal permit is required-a logical
outcome on federally governed land.
Finally, federal common law has long established federal and
tribal governance over Indian country and Indian affairs to the
exclusion of states.'73 Courts should presume that Congress
legislated with this broad, deep-seated principle in mind.'74 Because
the CAA does not clearly grant regulatory authority over non-
reservation Indian country to states, the D.C. Circuit erred in
failing to consider Congress' awareness of federal primacy in
Indian affairs. 
7 5
D. The Threat to Tribal Interests
Fourth, the D.C. Circuit's decision will negatively impact tribes.
The EPA is a better and more uniform advocate for the interests of
Indian tribes than the states. The federal government has a legal
duty to act in the best interests of tribes,7 6 whereas the states have
173. See supra Part II.
174. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) ("We
generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to
the legislation it enacts.").
175. See id. at 185 ("In the absence of affirmative evidence in the language or
history of the statute, we are unwilling to assume that Congress was ignorant of
[existing law].").
176. See supra Part II; see also United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-
10 (1935); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001); HRI, Inc.
v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg.
67,249, 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000) ("The United States has a unique legal relationship
with Indian tribal governments as set forth in the Constitution of the United
States, treaties, statutes, Executive Orders, and court decisions. Since the
formation of the Union, the United States has recognized Indian tribes as
domestic dependent nations under its protection. The Federal Government has
enacted numerous statutes and promulgated numerous regulations that establish
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no such obligation. Further, the United States government has
affirmatively declared its policy of encouraging tribal self-
governance. In 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order
13,175, which stated, "The United States recognizes the right of
Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty
and self-determination."' Executive Order 13,175 requires federal
agencies-including the EPA-to act in the best interests of Indian
tribes when formulating and implementing policies that may affect
Indian tribes."' Namely, agencies must honor tribal rights, grant
administrative discretion to tribal governments, and involve tribes
in the formulation and implementation of policies that have tribal
implications.
In 2009, President Obama directed agencies to submit a
detailed plan of action for implementing the directives of Executive
Order 13,175, stating, "My Administration is committed to regular
and meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials
in policy decisions that have tribal implications .. ,,80 In response,
the EPA submitted its Plan to Develop a Tribal Consultation and
and define a trust relationship with Indian tribes.").
177. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,249. Another example of the
federal government's policy of facilitating tribal self-governance is the Tribal Law
and Order Act of 2010, which increases tribal control over law enforcement in
Indian country. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124
Stat. 2258, 2261-301. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 acknowledges that
"tribal justice systems are often the most appropriate institutions for maintaining
law and order in Indian country." Id. at 2262. Further, it states that one purpose of
the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 is to "empower tribal governments with the
authority . .. necessary to safely and effectively provide public safety in Indian
country." Id. at 2263. The Supreme Court, too, has recognized the importance of
tribal self-governance. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024,
2030 (2014) ("[Tribal sovereign] immunity, we have explained is 'a necessary
corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.' (quoting Three Affiliated
Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890
(1986))); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987)
("The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty
and the congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its 'overriding
goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." (quoting
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1983))), superseded
by statute, Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467
(1988).
178. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,249-50.
179. Id.
180. Tribal Consultation Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 57881, 57881 (Nov. 5, 2009).
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Coordination Policy Implementing Executive Order 13,175. "' The plan
stressed the importance of tribal sovereignty and tribal-federal
cooperation. 1 2 Subsequently, the EPA released its Policy on
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes.'8' The policy stated
the EPA's intention to "consult on a government-to-government
basis with federally recognized tribal governments when EPA
actions and decisions may affect tribal interests. Consultation is a
process of meaningful communication and coordination between
EPA and tribal officials prior to EPA taking actions or
implementing decisions that may affect tribes.' ', 4 In short, the
policy reflects the EPA's commitment to partner with tribes and to
use a nationwide approach to such partnership in order to
encourage "consistency and predictability" for the purpose of
encouraging tribal self-governance, as well as environmental
protection. Due to this commitment, the EPA, rather than the
states, is more likely to promote tribal interests on non-reservation
Indian lands. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit's decision... is a
setback for tribal sovereignty and self-governance.
In addition, the D.C. Circuit's partial vacatur of the Indian
Country NSR Rule may deter development in Indian country. To
illustrate the potential confusion that the D.C. Circuit's decision
creates, imagine an entity that wishes to construct or modify a
source of air emissions in an area of Indian country where no TIP
applies. The entity must first determine if the land it wishes to
181. EPA, PLAN TO DEVELOP A TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION
POLICY IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13175; see also Consultation: Introduction,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/consultation/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
182. See Consultation: Introduction, supra note 181.
183. EPA, POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES 1
(2011) [hereinafter POLICY ON CONSULTATION]. The EPA published its proposed
policy in the Federal Register. See Proposed Final Policy on Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribes, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,198, 78,198-202 (proposed Dec.
15, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). The EPA did not publish the final
policy in the Federal Register, but rather provides access to the policy online. See
EPA Consultation and Coordination Policy: Final Policy for Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribes, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/consultation/consult
-policy.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Final Policy for Consultation]. The
EPA also responded to comments received on the Proposed Final Policy. EPA,
RESPONSES TO TRIBAL COMMENTS ON PROPOSED EPA CONSULTATION POLICY. See
generally Final Policy for Consultation, supra.
184. POLICY ON CONSULTATION, supra note 183, at 1.
185. Id.
186. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 740 F.3d 185 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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develop is reservation or non-reservation Indian country. If the
land is non-reservation Indian country, the entity must seek a
permit from the state within which boundaries such land is
located. 187 Unlike Oklahoma, another state might be reluctant to
issue permits in a geographic area that it did not previously
regulate, or it might be hesitant to issue permits in Indian country,
where Indian tribes and the federal government typically exercise
law enforcement responsibilities.'8 If the land is reservation Indian
country, then the entity must seek a permit from the EPA," whose
requirements could differ from the state's requirements for the
same type of permit for non-reservation Indian country lands
adjacent to the reservation lands and occupied by the same tribe.
In contrast to this scenario, if the D.C. Circuit had left the Indian
Country NSR Rule fully intact, the entity wishing to develop in
Indian country would simply seek a permit from a nationwide
program operated by the EPA, an agency that has repeatedly
acknowledged its duty to further tribal interests and tribal self-
governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of decades of jurisprudence establishing the federal
government's primacy over Indian affairs, the EPA does and should
have authority to implement a nationwide federal permitting
187. A tribe, if it had the necessary resources and could meet the
requirements of the CAA, could implement a TIP for its non-reservation Indian
Country lands and thereby displace the applicable SIP. See Okla. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 740 F.3d at 193-94 ("A state has 'primary responsibility,' i.e.,jurisdiction,
'within the entire geographic area comprising such State,' . . except insofar as the
EPA has authorized the treatment of 'Indian tribes as States' pursuant to [section
301(d) of the CAA]." (citations omitted)). Thereafter, the tribe could issue itself a
permit pursuant to the TIP.
188. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 19,
§§ 7.02-.04 (explaining tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction over civil matters in
Indian country); id. § 9.03[1] (explaining that states generally lack criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country). For information about the CAA's criminal
enforcement provisions, see generally Robert Brager, Laura McAfee & Heidi
Knight, Criminal Enforcement, in AM. BAR ASS'N, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK,
supra note 44, at 665.
189. ODEQ only challenged-and the D.C. Circuit only vacated-the Indian
Country NSR Rule with respect to non-reservation Indian country, so the FIP
provided by the rule still applies to reservation Indian country where no TIP
currently exists. See Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 195.
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program for all of Indian country, including non-reservation lands.
The D.C. Circuit's contrary conclusion in Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality v. EPA reintroduces the regulatory gap that
the EPA intended to fill through the Indian Country NSR Rule 90
and thereby reintroduces confusion to development in Indian
country.")' Further, the D.C. Circuit's decision defies a bedrock
principle of Indian law-that state laws generally do not apply to
Indian affairs in Indian country absent express authorization by
Congress. 9  Although the Clean Air Act makes no such
authorization, the D.C. Circuit held that states have default
regulatory authority over non-reservation areas of Indian country.193
Because the federal government actively encourages tribal self-
governance-while states do not necessarily do the same-the D.C.
Circuit's decision undermines tribal sovereignty and invites further
state regulatory encroachment in Indian country.
190. See supra Part V.C.
191. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. See generally Okla. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 740 F.3d 185.
192. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
193. Okla. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 740 F.3d at 195.
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